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Abstract  
We investigate whether different ages of first-time house buying lead to persistent differences 
in homeownership between cohorts. Our data span nearly forty years and multiple cycles of 
England’s volatile house prices. Ownership rates at thirty have differed substantially, with a 
significant negative association with prices. The persistence of differences is assessed using 
synthetic cohort techniques. Two methods of dealing with measurement error problems both 
indicate that cohorts with low ownership rates at thirty catch up almost all of the ownership 
gap by forty. Earlier access to homeownership may result in the ownership of slightly larger 
homes at around forty. 
JEL Classification numbers: R21, R31  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The birth cohort born in 1967 turned twenty-two in 1989. Some were graduating from 
university, while others had been in the labour market a few years. Most aspired to starting 
families and owning their own homes. In the United Kingdom, these twenty-two year olds 
faced a housing market in which average prices had been rising for seven years, and had risen 
70% in real terms in the last four years. The ratio of average house prices to average earnings 
was 5.5. By contrast, when the cohort of 1975 turned twenty-two in 1997, house prices were 
more than 20% lower than in 1989. Incomes had been catching up with prices, so that the 
house price to earnings ratio was 4. In short, this cohort faced a very different housing market 
in early adulthood than the cohort that turned twenty-two eight years earlier.1  As widely 
noted in the press, the rapid recovery of the housing market over the last few years has 
generated another cohort facing a booming housing market in early adulthood.2  Do these 
differences matter? 
These differences may matter both in the short run and in the long run. In the short 
run, cohorts faced with difficult housing market conditions may, on average, be delayed in 
‘getting on the property ladder.’ Perhaps even more seriously, these differences may also 
matter for the longer run homeownership rates of a cohort, and for other outcomes of those 
cohorts. Some members of a cohort that is delayed in its initial ownership transitions may 
find that they are never able to make the transition to owning their own home, and the 
ownership rate of the cohort may never ‘catch up’ to that of cohorts that faced more 
favourable initial conditions. Additionally or alternatively, delayed ownership may be 
associated with consuming less housing (owning smaller houses) at later ages.  
Literature suggests that factors that delay or discourage ownership may be associated 
with long-run changes in other outcomes, and so in well-being. Recent research in the U.S. 
suggests that house prices can affect fertility decisions (Dettling and Kearney, 2014) and that 
home ownership and home equity are the major drivers of cohort-level differences in wealth 
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at retirement (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Research has also shown that home owners use 
home-equity withdrawal as a financial buffer and smoothing mechanism in both the U.S. and 
U.K. (Hurst and Stafford, 2004; Benito, 2009); this consumption smoothing mechanism is 
not available to non-owners. Finally Banks et al, (2010) demonstrate that earlier ownership is 
an important hedge against house-price volatility in the U.K.  
 
Given the evidence of links between home-ownership and outcomes that affect well-
being, it is important to measure how factors such as housing market conditions are 
associated with differences in home-ownership. Recent theoretical modeling (Bottazzi, Low 
and Wakefield, 2007) suggests that housing market conditions early in a cohort’s housing 
career matter in the short run, but not in the long run. Simulations indicate that disadvantaged 
cohorts catch up, so that they have comparable homeownership rates as they approach their 
fifties. This would significantly diminish the role of early life housing-market conditions in 
shaping later outcomes. However, these simulation results are sensitive to modeling choices, 
and so an empirical assessment of these questions remains important.  
In this paper we provide such an empirical assessment. We use the repeated cross 
sections of the Family Expenditure Survey/Expenditure and Food Survey (FES/EFS) from 
1969 to 2007 to answer several questions.3 First, as each birth cohort reaches adulthood, how 
do their transitions to homeownership vary with general housing market conditions? 
Specifically, if we compare two cohorts, one that faced a property boom in their twenties and 
one facing a property slump, how different are their ownership rates at age thirty? Second, 
how persistent are the resulting differences? That is, do the homeownership rates of these two 
cohorts converge at older ages? Finally, are age thirty differences in ownership associated 
with other aspects of housing tenure at older ages, including house size, and mortgage status? 
The FES/EFS is not a true panel, in that individuals (or individual households) are not 
followed over time. However, because the FES/EFS surveys provide us with a representative 
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sample of the population in any survey year, it also gives us a representative sample of each 
birth cohort in any survey year. We use the repeated cross-sections of the FES/EFS in two 
ways. First, we hold age constant and look at variation in ownership across birth cohorts. The 
resulting age-specific ownership rate evolves over time as different cohorts pass through the 
age of interest, but will differ from the overall homeownership time-series, which is at every 
point in time an amalgam of different cohorts and ages.  Second, we employ synthetic-cohort 
methods, holding cohort constant and using the repeated surveys to track birth cohorts across 
ages (and hence over time.) This allows us to study whether cohorts catch up in 
homeownership, which is a novel contribution of the paper.  
A brief preview of our results is as follows. First, over the past forty years there has 
been considerable cross-cohort variation in the rate at which different birth cohorts transition 
to homeownership.  Ownership rates at thirty have ranged from around fifty percent to 
approximately seventy percent.  Second, this variation is correlated with house price 
developments over time, although that relationship seems stronger before 1990 than since. 
Overall, our results suggest that when a birth cohort faces a house price to average income 
ratio at age thirty that is one standard deviation above trend, then the homeownership rate of 
that birth cohort at age thirty is approximately 4 percentage points lower.  Third, there is 
strong negative correlation between cohort ownership rates at age thirty and subsequent 
growth in ownership: cohorts that have low ownership at thirty appear to have fast growth in 
homeownership subsequently. Historically, cohorts with low homeownership rates at thirty 
have closed about 80% of the “ownership-gap” by the time they reach age forty. Finally, we 
find evidence that cohorts that get on the housing ladder earlier own larger homes in middle 
age, but no evidence that they are more likely to own their homes outright, or have lower 
mortgage payment to income ratios.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II elaborates on the historical 
context for our study, and describes the data and methods we employ (with further details of 
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our data and methods provided in an online only Technical Appendix). Section III then 
analyses the pattern of ownership at age thirty across birth cohorts and how this correlates 
with house price developments. Section IV considers the question of the persistence of these 
differences and Section V considers the association of age-30 ownership rates with later life 
housing outcomes.  Section VI concludes. 
 
II. CONTEXT, DATA, AND METHODS 
Context 
This study concerns the rate at which households have been able to get onto the housing 
ladder during the last forty years. Housing market conditions, most notably house prices, 
have affected the affordability of homeownership during this period. Additionally, trends in 
access to finance and public policy reforms have affected the accessibility of home purchase. 
In this subsection we describe trends in average house prices and in their relationship to 
average family incomes,4 and in credit conditions, and also outline an important public policy 
programme that has affected homeownership rates (at different ages) in the years of the 
study. These trends and changes are factors that we will exploit, or need to take account of, in 
the analysis of the later sections of the paper.  
Over the 35 years to 2007, England experienced three house price booms and two 
periods of significant house price decline. This can be seen in the “House Price” panel of 
Figure 1, which shows a quarterly measure of the (mix-adjusted) average real house price 
(dashed black line) and the (mix-adjusted) average real house price for first-time buyers 
(solid black line), for England, superimposed over a measure of the cyclical element of 
national GDP. Trends and cyclical movements are seen to be remarkably similar for all 
properties and for properties bought by first-time buyers, with first-time buyers buying 
properties that cost around 20 to 25 per cent less than the overall average. Over the whole 
period 1969-2007, average real house prices (and first-time buyer house prices) in England 
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increased by a multiple of almost four. As mentioned, this did not happen through a 
continuous upward trend. House price booms are seen in the early and middle 1970s, in the 
second half of the 1980s (during which period average real house prices rose by over 60% in 
four years), and in the period between 1995 and the early 2000s (until 2007). Real terms 
house price falls were experienced between 1974 and 1977 (a period which was not followed 
by sustained price growth until after 1985), and in the first half of the 1990s (during which 
period average real prices fell by almost forty percent). By superimposing house prices over 
deviations of GDP from trend we can see that during the 1970s and 1980s house price cycles 
tended to coincide with movements in the underlying economy. However, after the recession 
of the early 1990s and a trough in house prices in the mid 1990s, GDP has not deviated 
strongly from trend while house prices displayed strong growth for more than 10 years. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
The right hand “House Price to Income” panel of Figure 1 displays, as a solid black 
line, the ratio of (average) first-time buyer house prices to average incomes of those aged 
around 30 (again superimposed over deviations of GDP from trend). This ratio might be 
thought a stronger indicator of housing “affordability” than the price level, and is an 
important variable in our regression analyses later in the paper. With the possible exception 
of the final run up in the price level after the mid-1990s, using the price to income variable 
largely takes out the upward drift over time seen in house prices, as average incomes have 
also grown. However, house price cycles have been more pronounced than cycles in average 
family incomes and so the price to income ratio shows cyclical movements that reflect the 
price cycles discussed in the previous paragraph: the price to income ratio spikes up in the 
early 1970s, in the late 1980s, and again after the middle 1990s, and the ratio fell in the 
middle 1970s and in the early to middle 1990s.      
Changes in house prices are not the only factor that have changed and will have 
affected the ability of households to get on and climb the property ladder during the last four 
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decades. This is also a period during which substantial changes in credit markets took place. 
In addition, some public policy changes have been important.  
Regarding credit conditions, the 1980s was a period of substantial credit market 
liberalization. As is clear from the important work of Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer 
(2006), detailed modelling work is needed to accurately quantify credit conditions.5 Their 
exercises provide a clear indication of the extent to which credit conditions changed during 
the 1980s. Describing their two measures of consumer credit conditions between 1975 and 
2001, they write that “[b]oth indices increase in the 1980s, peaking towards the end of the 
decade. They fall partway back in the early 1990s, before increasing again towards the end of 
the sample” (ibid, p.4). A close look at their indices shows that the increase during the 1980s 
was particularly rapid during the first three years of that decade.   
At the same time as the financial liberalization was taking hold, a major policy reform 
was also affecting the English housing market. This was the “right to buy” scheme which 
allowed council tenants (i.e. those renting social housing) the right to buy their properties at 
prices that were discounted compared to market values, with discounts depending on the 
length of tenancy. This became national policy6 with the passing of the Housing Act of 
(October) 1980, and resulted in a transfer of households from the social renting sector into 
owner-occupation. Figure 2 shows official statistics for the number of right to buy sales of 
local authority properties in England for each (financial) year from 1980/81.7 We see that 
there were particularly big spikes in such house sales at either end of the 1980s, with a 
smaller peak in the early 2000s; by 2008/09 almost 1.8 million local authority properties had 
been sold.8 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Data 
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Our aim is to study the multiple housing booms and busts that occurred over the last four 
decades in England. Panel data that track the same individuals over this entire period do not 
exist. The British Household Panel Study, for example, has excellent data on housing 
arrangements, but begins in 1991. Thus, only fifteen birth cohorts can be observed at any age, 
and only one house-price boom can be studied. While much important housing research can 
be done with these data, such as about the decision to leave the parental home (Ermisch, 
1999), it is of limited use for our purposes. Instead, we use the Family Expenditure 
Survey/Expenditure and Food Survey (FES/EFS) which is available since 1968 and therefore 
allows multiple comparisons between cohorts that experienced favourable and unfavourable 
housing market conditions in their late twenties. 
The FES/EFS is an annual cross section of around 7,000 households, who record a 
two-week diary of their spending and information about purchases of durables and/or 
expensive items in recent months prior to the interview. Importantly for our study, the survey 
provides information on the housing tenure of respondents, on the number of rooms in their 
house, on their mortgage debt, as well as on their income, education, and family structure.  In 
all our calculations we use the appropriate survey weights.  
We supplement the FES/EFS data with data on house prices and on sales of local 
authority housing through the right to buy scheme, a measure of interest rates and a credit 
conditions index. We use official Government national and (for house prices) regional data, 
provided through the Office for National Statistics (ONS)9; detailed information on how the 
house-price data are set up may be found in the online Technical Appendix. The data on right 
to buy sales are those underlying Figure 2 above. The interest rate that we use is the 90 day 
Treasury Bill Discount Rate10. The Credit Conditions Index that we use is the unified 
measure generated by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer; it is discussed at more length in 
our online technical appendix and in detail in Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). 
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Methods 
We use the repeated cross-sections of the FES/EFS in two ways. First, we hold age 
constant and look at variation in ownership across birth cohorts. The resulting age-specific 
ownership rate evolves over time as different cohorts pass through the age of interest, but will 
differ from the overall homeownership time-series, which is at every point in time a size-
weighted average amalgam of different age groups (and hence birth cohorts).  The repeated 
cross-sections allow us to focus on each cohort as it passes through young adulthood. 
Second, the FES/EFS allows us to study the housing careers of more than thirty birth 
cohorts through synthetic cohort analysis. The basic idea of synthetic cohort analysis is as 
follows. With repeated cross sections we cannot track individuals over time. However, in 
each survey year we get a representative sample from each birth cohort, and so by using 
successive cross sections, we can follow the average characteristics of a birth cohort through 
time. In particular, for any birth cohort, we can estimate its ownership rate in every survey 
year and hence at different ages. Myers (1999, 2001) has emphasized the importance of 
accounting for cohort effects in the analysis of housing careers, and the utility of cohort 
studies as an important alternative to cross-sectional and longitudinal approaches to exploring 
housing patterns. At the same time, cohort analysis often offers a longer time span than does 
the available panel data (as is the case here); in addition, the use of repeated cross-sections to 
follow synthetic cohorts avoids the  attrition and small sample problems that often limit panel 
data analyses.  
 With thirty-nine FES/EFS surveys available to us (1969-2007) we can potentially 
follow some cohorts for thirty-nine years. However, we largely focus on ages thirty to forty 
(and sometimes ages thirty to fifty). 
Although the FES/EFS are household surveys, we believe the appropriate unit of 
analysis is the individual and in this study we follow cohorts of individuals. Although it takes 
some care, birth cohorts of individuals can be constructed from the FES/EFS. The concept of 
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a “household life-cycle” is commonplace in economic studies, but such an approach has 
several drawbacks. A household is a collection of individuals, each of whom may belong to 
different cohorts and, at any given time, may be at a different stage of the life-cycle. 
Although the ambiguity of a “household life-cycle” is well recognized, this ambiguity is often 
ignored because of the potential complexity of discerning individual profiles of household 
members from household data. 
Moreover, many transitions in housing arrangements are associated with household 
formation or dissolution or with changes in household composition. Recent NHPAU research 
on affordability has focussed on the issue of household formation (NHPAU, 2008). Myers 
(1990) explains this concern with following the housing careers of households: “[w]hereas 
most housing research begins with the behaviour of households, the logical prior concern in 
this type of research is with the formation of households from a population” (p. 14). Housing 
studies that followed housing choices of (cohorts of) couples would miss much of the 
important action. 
Instead, in this study, we follow cohorts of individuals. To generate individual birth 
cohorts from household data, we create individual observations whenever we see an 
individual of a certain age and gender in a household record. The FES/EFS contains 
information on household and individual characteristics thus allowing us to create detailed 
records from which to construct individual birth cohorts for adults of all ages. Hence we are 
able to track changes in housing tenure alongside changes in family composition for both 
men and women. 
When structuring the data into cohorts of individuals, some care is required with 
allocating homeownership. We take ownership to be a shared state, so that if we see a couple 
living in a property that is owned (with a mortgage or outright) by either member of the 
couple, then our data records both members of the couple as being owner-occupiers. Thus 
when we consider counts of individuals, both of these individuals will be counted as owners. 
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However, we do not necessarily allocate the same ownership status to all members of a 
household. In particular, we are careful about how we allocate ownership for young adults 
who are still living in the parental home. Such individuals will appear as observations in our 
dataset, which includes all adults. However, even if the data record that the parents own their 
home, our analysis does not treat the children as home-owners. Recording ownership state in 
this way ensures that there is not an apparent fall in ownership in the early and middle 
twenties as individuals move out of home (often into the rental sector), followed by an 
increase when the same individuals become (first-time) buyers. 
In presenting our analyses, we sometimes write as if the increase in the 
homeownership rate for a given cohort is the proportion of that group that became home 
owners between one year and the next. That is, we interpret this change as the gross flow in 
to housing between one year and the next. However, the flow that we observe is actually the 
net flow. That is, it is the number moving into homeownership, net of the number transiting 
in the other direction back in to the rental sector. Whether this net flow provides a good 
approximation to the gross flow depends on how the number of individuals buying houses 
compares to the number of individuals in the same group (of the same age) who move from 
being owners back into the rental sector. 
We undertook some preliminary analysis of this issue using the BHPS. Because the 
BHPS is a true panel, both gross and net flows are observed directly. Fortunately, for 
individuals in the age ranges that we are considering, net flows approximate gross flows quite 
closely.  Among individuals in their twenties, there are relatively few individuals transiting 
back into renting because relatively few already own. Around age thirty, when the ownership 
rate is around 60% (cf. Table 2), the proportion of owners that switch to renting is around 
2%, and this tends to decline with age throughout the working life (being around 1% at age 
forty). Thus, though home-owners are in the majority at these ages, the numbers switching 
back to rental remain small.11 Thus, while the reader should bear in mind that what we 
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actually observe are net flows in to ownership, it is not too large a distortion to discuss our 
results as if we were observing a gross flow.  
The size of the FES/EFS dataset allows us to split our analyses by region. Regional 
analysis is of independent interest; moreover, splitting by region potentially provides 
additional variation in prices to exploit. However, the synthetic cohort part of our analysis 
rests on the assumption that the composition of the cohort being followed is fixed over time. 
This assumption might be undermined if migration flows between regions are sufficiently 
large. We have investigated this issue empirically and concluded that it is reasonable to 
follow cohorts defined by birth-year and region. Further details are provided in the online 
Technical Appendix.  
 
 
III. GETTING ON THE HOUSING LADDER: HOMEOWNERSHIP AT THIRTY 
We begin by calculating the homeownership rate of individuals aged twenty-nine to thirty-
one for every year in the data. Figure 3 displays the homeownership rate for thirty-year olds 
through time. For the figure, the ownership rate was calculated using survey weights so that 
resulting rate should be representative of the population of interest. The ownership rate is 
displayed alongside the ratio of the first-time buyer house price to average incomes around 
age 30 (the same price to income ratio that was displayed in the right-hand panel of Figure 1, 
but at an annual frequency). The house price series is in grey and dashed with data points 
marked by crosses, and the house price boom that began in the mid-1990s is clear in the 
graphs. The ownership series is a solid black line with rings as markers. Note that because we 
are holding age constant, the x-axis measures both survey year and birth cohort: thirty year-
olds in 1970 are from the 1940 birth cohort and so on.   
Over the past forty years there has been considerable cross-cohort variation in the rate 
at which different birth cohorts have transited to homeownership. Figure 3 shows that 
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ownership rates at thirty range from around 50 percent to approximately 70 percent, with 
both up and down swings. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The data in Figure 3 do suggest a relationship such that high prices (relative to 
income) coincide with low ownership among thirty-year olds, particularly before 1990. The 
peaks and troughs in prices before the mid-1980s approximately correspond to troughs and 
peaks in the age-thirty ownership rate. It is also the case that the strong run up in the house 
price after 1995 is associated with a downward drift in age-thirty ownership (although this 
downward drift did begin before house prices began to climb). However, between 1980 and 
1985 the noticeable feature of the data is a strong surge in the age-thirty ownership rate, from 
around fifty-five percent, past its previous peak of almost sixty percent, and up to almost 
seventy percent. While this increase seemed to reverse somewhat as house prices began to 
grow rapidly in 1986 and 1987, it is worth noting that the reverse began before prices reached 
their peak in the late 1980s, but, as already noted, turned to a secular decline even while 
prices were falling at the beginning of the 1990s. It is likely that pressures other than prices – 
such as the already noted credit liberalization, and the “right to buy” policy – were affecting 
ownership rates strongly at some points between 1980 and the early 1990s, and in the figure 
this swamps the effect of the prices relative to income on affordability.   
Disaggregations illustrate that trends in the home-ownership rates of thirty year-old 
men and women, or of thirty year-olds in broad regions (North, Midlands and South) of 
England, have been similar to the patterns shown in Figure 3.12 Figure 4 explores differences 
or similarities in trends for single individuals and individuals that live as part of a couple. 
Specifically, the figure again shows the ownership rate of all thirty year olds, and also shows 
the ownership rates for the subsets of individuals that are single and that live as part of a 
couple, and finally the proportion of thirty year-olds that are in a couple. The figure thus 
shows differences in ownership rates between singles and couples, and also highlights that 
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trends in the overall ownership rate have been related not only to trends in ownership among 
singles and couples, but also to changes in the proportion of the population who are living as 
part of a couple.  
[Figure 4 about here] 
A simple accounting identity is that: 
 
Ownership rate of 30 year-olds = 
Fraction in a couple  x  ownership rate among coupled 30 year-olds  
+  Fraction single  x  ownership rate among single 30 year olds 
 
Figure 4 shows that the ownership rate among coupled thirty-year olds has fallen 
relatively little since 1990, while the ownership rate of single thirty-year olds has fallen a bit 
more. Young coupled individuals have, unsurprisingly, always had higher ownership rates 
than young singles, and the proportion of thirty-year olds in couples has been falling (from 
over eighty percent in the 1970s, to around two-thirds in the early 1990s). This accounts for a 
substantial component of the fall in the overall ownership rate of thirty-year olds.  
While this observation provides a mechanical explanation of how the recent decline in 
ownership at thirty has occurred, a causal inference should not be drawn. It could be, for 
example, that the decline in the fraction of thirty year-olds who are a member of couple has 
been driven by a declining affordability of homeownership. The direction of causation is 
unclear.    
To quantify the relationship between house prices and ownership at thirty observed in 
these figures, we now turn to probit models for homeownership. Probit or logit models for 
homeownership (tenure choice) estimated on micro-data are well known in the literature. For 
example, Linneman and Wachter (1989) estimate Logit models for homeownership on 
American microdata, with a particular focus on wealth constraints. Hilber and Liu (2008) also 
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estimate a logit mode of tenure on American microdata but focusing on the roles of own and 
parental wealth, and location preference in explaining the black-white ownership gap in 
America. Bourassa and Hoesli, (2010) estimate a logistic regression for tenure choice on 
Swiss microdata focusing on wealth constraints and the relative costs of owning and renting.  
Our analysis is differentiated from these papers and the related literature by our use of 
data spanning a much longer period (and therefore, affording much more temporal variation 
in prices), and by our focus particularly on ownership at age thirty. The papers cited above 
pool households of a range of ages. They do typically include age variables among the 
demographic controls in their tenure choice models. But the linear index models they use 
constrain the estimated relationship between tenure choice and other variables (for example 
prices) to evolve with age in a very particular way. By focusing very narrowly on young 
adults, we can estimate the correlates of ownership at age thirty without constraining the 
parameters to fit the choices of other age groups. Against this, a number of the papers cited 
above model the relative costs of ownership and rent, or the wealth and credit constraints, in 
more detail than we do here. Like Hilber and Liu, we take a reduced form approach.   
Estimates of four probit models of homeownership at age 30 are reported in Table 1. 
All are based on pooled data on individuals from many waves of the FES/EFS. In all three 
cases the dependent variable is whether or not the individual owns a property at age thirty.  
They differ by the set of conditioning variables and the range of years of data employed. The 
latter is driven by the former: in each case we use all the years for which data on the included 
conditioning variables are available.13 As always we make appropriate use of survey weights. 
Standard errors are clustered on the year level to reflect the fact that the most aggregated 
regressors in our specifications vary at the annual level.  
The first three models contain the ratio of house prices to income as a measure of 
housing affordability. For this purpose, house prices are taken from the (mix-adjusted) first-
time buyers series at region and quarter level. Income is averaged among 26-34 year-olds (in 
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region and quarter).  The regressions also include the interest rate as a measure of the cost of 
homeownership.  
The models also include two variables measuring the number of “right to buy” sales 
of local authority housing in England. These two variables are intended to capture the impact 
of right to buy on the number of properties up for sale in a particular year, and on the size of 
the stock of properties in the owner-occupied sector, and respectively measure the number of 
right to buy sales (in hundreds of thousands) in the (financial) year in which an individual is 
observed and the cumulative number of sales (again in hundreds of thousands) since the right 
to buy became a national scheme in late 1980. Given the years in which the right to buy has 
been an active policy, it is possible that our right to buy variables also pick up some effects of 
the financial market changes discussed in the first part of Section II.14     
Additional controls that are common to all the models include the gender of the 
individual and whether he or she is a member of a couple; the log of family income; and the 
number of children.  
The first model (in the left-most column) is our base specification and it is estimated 
on pooled data from 1969 to 2007. The second model (middle-left column) adds a measure of 
the individual’s education and is estimated on data from 1978 on (when education began to 
be recorded in the FES/EFS). The third model (middle-right column) adds, in addition to 
education, the credit conditions index developed by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer 
(2006). As we have this variable only until 2005, this model is estimated on pooled data from 
1978 to 2005.15 The fourth model excludes the house price to income variable, but otherwise 
matches the third model in terms of regressors and data.  
The variable for right to buy sales this year is significant in the first and second 
specifications, suggesting that ownership at thirty has tended to be higher in years with 
greater numbers of right to buy sales, and the variable recording the cumulative number of 
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sales is never significant. Unsurprisingly, family income and family characteristics (couple 
and number of children) are also strongly and significantly associated with homeownership.  
The ratio between house price and income is significant and has a negative sign in all 
three specifications in which it is included, indicating that higher prices, relative to income, 
are associated with lower ownership rates among thirty year-olds. That is, thirty year-olds 
own less when housing is less affordable. In the first column, the marginal effect on the price-
to-income variable suggests that if the house price to income ratio goes up by one standard 
deviation – which is almost exactly 116 –, then homeownership would be slightly more than 4 
percentage points lower.  The strength of this relationship is robust to adding controls for 
education and credit conditions in columns 2 and 3: the relevant marginal effects in all three 
columns are of very similar magnitude. 
Credit conditions (measured by the index we use) are known to have important effects 
on the level of real house prices in Britain (Cameron, Muellbauer and Murphy, 2006).17 Thus, 
one possible explanation for why the credit conditions index is not significant and does not 
substantially affect the other parameters in the model, is that the effects of credit conditions 
“act through” house prices. The house price variable was excluded from the model in column 
4, in order to investigate this hypothesis. However, while excluding the house price to income 
ratio does lead to a change in sign for the coefficient on the credit conditions variable (and 
that on the interest rate), these variables remain insignificant.18       
We experimented with adding lags of the house price to income variable to the 
models presented. This allowed us to investigate whether price effects are stronger if prices 
have been persistently high relative to incomes as a cohort approaches thirty, than if they 
become high only near age thirty. We did not find significant evidence of such “dynamic 
price effects”. A single lag of anything between one and five years was not significant and 
did not much affect the coefficient on the current price to income, while a formal statistical 
test indicated that even adding all five lags together did not significantly improve the 
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explanatory power of the model. We conclude that the current price to (average) income is a 
sufficient control for price effects.19 
The results (notably for the price effects) are robust. Similar results are obtained 
whether we use the survey weights or not, and when we use data for Great Britain rather than 
for England alone. House price (to income) effects appear slightly smaller in magnitude (less 
negative) if the house price variable is based on the variation in the prices of all properties 
rather than in the prices of properties bought by first-time buyers; this is consistent with the 
notion that first-time buyer prices are more directly relevant to the house purchase decisions 
of our sample of interest. Using only national (as opposed to regional) house price variation 
also leads to a reduction in the magnitude of the point estimate of the marginal effect of the 
house price to income. Omitting individual characteristics (couple and number of children) 
from the model makes very little difference to the marginal house price (to income) effect. 
Adding a post-1980 dummy to the model reported in column 1 does slightly reduce the point 
estimate of the marginal effect for the house price to income variable (to three percentage 
points), and if we split the sample by education groups, the lower educated exhibit a stronger 
association with house prices. However, even in these cases (as in all the cases discussed in 
this paragraph) we cannot reject the hypothesis that the effect estimated in our baseline model 
(usually column 1 of Table 1) is equal to the point estimate obtained in the modified model. 20 
[Table 1 about here] 
To summarize: homeownership rates at age thirty vary substantially across birth 
cohorts and the data support the idea that unfavourable housing market conditions in early 
adulthood are associated with delays in the transition of birth cohorts into homeownership. 
  
IV. IS THERE CATCH UP AFTER THIRTY? 
We now turn to the question of whether those cohorts that were less able to get onto the 
ladder by thirty were nonetheless able to “catch up” with other cohorts at older ages. Do early 
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differences in the rate of transition to homeownership persist into later life? Are other 
outcomes, such as the amount of housing assets owned, affected by ownership at age thirty? 
This is a critical issue from a number of policy perspectives. For example, as noted in the 
introduction, homeownership is a strong predictor of economic security in retirement.  
Figure 5, in which we present homeownership rates at different ages across years, 
provides a first look at this question. The solid black line is the ownership rate for thirty year-
olds, the dashed grey line (square markers) is this rate for forty year-olds, and so on with the 
solid dark grey line (round markers) being the ownership rate among individuals aged 
seventy.  
We see that for each group there is a substantial increase in the proportion of owners 
during the period before 1990, a time trend that reflects the right to buy policy and credit 
market liberalization, among other things. After 1990, the homeownership rate for thirty year 
olds declines sharply, as we saw for the ownership rate of thirty year olds in Figure 3. This is 
a contrast to the ownership rates for other age groups, which stayed roughly constant or even 
continued to increase slowly. This contrast already suggests some catch up: individuals who 
were thirty in 1990 did not own substantially more when they were forty than was the case 
for those who were thirty five years later. Thus the higher ownership of the former group at 
thirty was offset by later transitions into owning for their successor cohort. 
[Figure 5 about here] 
Table 2 summarizes the variation in ownership rates across cohorts, at different ages. 
Panel (a) summarizes ownership rates at thirty and forty for those birth cohorts that we 
observe at both thirty and forty. Panel (b) does the same for ownership rates at thirty and fifty 
for the smaller set of cohorts that we observe at both those ages (see also Table A.1 in the 
online Technical Appendix). The Table indicates that there is less dispersion in ownership 
rates across birth cohorts at older ages than at younger ages. This is again indicative of “catch 
up”.  
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[Table 2 about here] 
To look more directly at catch up, in Figures 6 and 7, we plot the increase in 
ownership between age thirty and age forty (in Figure 6) and between age thirty and age fifty 
(in Figure 7) against ownership at age thirty.  In these figures, each point represents a birth-
cohort (and the points are labeled by the birth year of the cohort). In each figure there are four 
panels. The top-left panel displays the relationship for cohorts defined by birth-year only (that 
is, for all of England). The remaining three panels repeat the analysis separately for each of 
three regions: North (top-right), Midlands (bottom-left) and South (bottom-right). 
[Figures 6 and 7 about here] 
Catch up implies a negative relationship: lower ownership at thirty must be associated 
with a greater subsequent increase and higher ownership at thirty with a lower subsequent 
increase. This is exactly what we see in Figure 6 (catch up by forty) and Figure 7 (catch up by 
fifty). The same pattern is observed at the national level and in each region. For example, in 
the top left panel of Figure 6, we see that the 1940 birth cohort (thirty in 1970) has a low 
homeownership rate at age thirty of 47% (see also Table A.1 in the online Appendix) but 
experiences a substantial increase in homeownership – of 16 percentage points – between 
ages thirty and forty. In contrast, the 1954 birth cohort (thirty in 1984) has a much higher 
homeownership rate at age thirty of 71% but experiences very little increase in 
homeownership – just  2 percentage points – between ages thirty and forty.  
However, there is a potential problem with these figures. We know that ownership at 
thirty is measured with error. For each cohort, it is an estimate, based on the representative 
sample of that birth cohort found in the appropriate year of the FES/EFS. These estimates are 
naturally subject to sampling error, and this sampling error is effectively a kind of 
measurement error (Deaton, 1985). The ownership rate at thirty will be slightly over-
estimated for some cohorts, and slightly under estimated for others. This measurement error 
may affect the figures in two ways.  
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  First, ownership at thirty appears on the horizontal axis in each figure.  Measurement 
error in the horizontal variable creates attenuation bias and makes the relationship appear 
flatter than it actually is; in the case of a negative relationship like that documented in Figures 
6 and Figure 7, this means the slope is less negative than it should be, understating the true 
degree of catch up.   
Second, ownership at thirty is also used to construct the variable (change in 
ownership) on the vertical axis, which it enters negatively. Ownership rates at forty will be 
subject to sampling error as well, but because these are based (for each cohort) on an 
independent sample, the sample errors in ownership at forty will be unrelated to sampling 
errors in ownership at thirty. The way ownership at thirty features on both axes means that 
cohorts that have positive measurement errors in ownership at thirty will appear to have 
smaller subsequent increases in ownership. Measurement error in ownership at thirty 
therefore creates a spurious negative correlation between change in ownership (on the vertical 
axis) and ownership at thirty (on the horizontal axis.) This makes the relationship appear 
more negative than it actually is, overstating the true degree of catch up. (These arguments 
are formalized below). 
These two effects operate in opposite directions so that the direction of net bias is 
unclear. One might hope that they roughly cancel, but there is no guarantee that this is the 
case. Therefore, we next employ two methods that allow us to circumvent these measurement 
problems and quantify the degree of catch up.21  
To quantify the catch up suggested by the figures we regress the change in the 
ownership rate between thirty and forty, on the ownership rate at age thirty. Catch up implies 
a negative coefficient on the initial condition (ownership at age thirty). If subsequent 
increases in homeownership are unrelated to ownership rates at thirty, then the coefficient on 
the latter should be zero. Complete catch up corresponds to a coefficient of minus one. In this 
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case of complete catch up, cohort ownership rates at forty are not predicted by ownership at 
thirty. 
We focus on catch up between thirty and forty because this maximizes the number of 
birth-cohort observations we can use in estimation. (In a given set of survey years, not all 
birth-cohorts are seen at all ages, and more cohorts are observed at both ages thirty and forty 
than at ages thirty and fifty.) Note that, unlike the econometric model reported in Section III, 
which was estimated on individual level data, the model here is estimated on cohort -level 
data (each observation is a birth cohort of individuals). It is infeasible to estimate this growth 
model on the pooled individual data because each individual is observed only once: it is only 
the birth cohort that is observed at more than one age. We use a linear model this time 
because our dependent variable is not dichotomous but rather is measured in percentage 
points.  The results are presented in Table 3.  
[Table 3 about here] 
We first estimate this model by ordinary least squares and the results of this 
estimation procedure are presented in column (1). In this regression the ownership rate at 
thirty is significant and negative – as we would expect given the figures in the previous 
subsection. The coefficient of -0.871 suggests that around 87% of the variation in birth cohort 
homeownership rates at age thirty is made up by age forty, and we cannot reject a coefficient 
of -1 (i.e. complete catch up). In column (2) we add to this model a dummy for reaching 
thirty in or after 1981, and the fraction of the cohort that were in a couple at thirty.22 This 
results in a slightly larger estimate of the extent of catch up of about 95%. 
However, these ordinary least squares estimates suffer from exactly the same problem 
as was described for Figures 6 and 7. Biases arising from measurement error in ownership at 
age thirty may lead to either over- or underestimates of the degree of catch up.  
There are two possible approaches to overcoming these problems. The first approach 
is to re-estimate our regression model by two-stage least squares (2SLS), using the ownership 
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rate at age twenty-nine as an instrument for our mis-measured independent variable, 
ownership at thirty. The ownership rate of a birth-cohort at age twenty-nine is very closely 
related to its ownership rate at thirty. The ownership rate at twenty-nine is measured with 
error, for the same reasons that the ownership rate at thirty is. However, because for each 
cohort the ownership rates at twenty-nine and thirty are based on different survey years (and 
hence independent samples), the measurement (or sampling) error in the ownership rate at 
twenty-nine should be unrelated to the measurement (or sampling) error in the ownership rate 
at thirty (and forty).  Thus the ownership rate at age twenty-nine is an ideal instrumental 
variable in this context.  
The results of this exercise are presented in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3. Relative 
to the OLS estimates, the point estimates of the catch up coefficient are somewhat diminished 
in magnitude. For example, for the specification with no additional controls, the coefficient 
goes from -0.871 to -0.835 (so that estimated degree of catch up goes from 87% to 84%).  
This suggests the net bias in the OLS estimate from measurement error is a small 
exaggeration (in magnitude). The small size of the net bias is consistent either with the two 
oppositely-signed biases described above both being small, or of very similar magnitudes 
(and so offsetting). The key point is that the 2SLS estimate still suggests substantial catch up, 
although the coefficient is now much less precisely estimated. 
The second approach to overcome the measurement error bias is based on the 
observation that the coefficient of interest can be corrected for the measurement error if an 
estimate of the degree of measurement error (!!! below) is available. In the case of pseudo-
panel analysis, as observed by Deaton (1985), such an estimate is available because the 
measurement error is just sampling error of the cohort-year cell mean, which can be 
estimated by standard methods.  
Deaton’s corrected estimators do not apply directly to our catch up regressions, but 
the formulas from that paper can easily be extended to our specification. In our case, the 
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explanatory variable of interest (x*) is ownership at thirty, while the outcome of interest  
(y* − x*) is the change in ownership between thirty and forty.  For the univariate case, let x* 
and y* indicate true variables and let x and y be the variables we observe with errors u and v, 
respectively (omitting year subscripts for y, x, and ε): !∗ − !∗ = !!∗ + ! ! = !∗ + ! ! = !∗ + ! 
We make standard assumptions about the structure of the model and of measurement 
errors: plim!!! ! ∗! = !plim!!! ! ∗! = plim!!! ! ∗! = 0 plim!!! ! " = !plim!!! ! " = 0 
We denote variances and covariances of true variables and measurement error as  plim!!! ! ∗!! = !!!∗!!!!!!!!!!!plim!!! ! ∗!∗ = !!!∗!∗ plim!!! ! ! = !!!!!!!!!!!!!plim!!! ! " = !!!" 
In our case u and v are sampling errors from different independent samples so from 
now on we assume  !!" = 0.  
The OLS estimator based on observed variables is (with sums taken over years) 
!!"# = ! !! !! ! − ! ! 
(Note that throughout this Section, and in our implementation of the estimator, x and y 
variables are in deviations from means.) 
This estimator is not consistent, having  
plim!!!"# = !!!!∗!!! − !!!!!!∗!!! + !!!! = !!!∗!!!!!∗!!! + !!!! !− ! !!!!!!∗!!! + !!!!! 
This last expression characterises the effects of the measurement error. The first 
element in the last sum above is standard attenuation bias due to measurement error in the x 
variable, and tends to make the estimator smaller in magnitude. The second element will tend 
to bias the estimator towards -1 (as the variance in the true x goes to zero).  
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We can (and do, see column (5) of Table 3) correct the estimate using the following 
expression: 
!!"# = ! ! !! − !!!! !! ! − ! ! + !!!!  
where  !!!!  is a consistent estimate of σ!!!. In our case, this is the variance of the cohort-year 
sample mean of ownership at thirty, which can be estimated from the pooled micro-data 
underlying the pseudo panel. In doing this, we weight cohort-year cells to allow for 
differences in cell size. 
Maintaining notation as much as possible (vectors in bold and t an index for year), the 
multivariate case is !!!∗ − !!!!!∗ = !!∗!!+ !! 
with !!! being the first element of the xt vector, which is ownership at thirty. 
The assumptions on the structure of the measurement error are such that the limiting 
distribution of the variance-covariance matrix of measurement errors is  !!! !′! !!!  
with 0 in this matrix again following from having sampling errors associated with 
independent samples and  Σuu  being the covariance matrix of the measurement error in the x 
variables (in our case, two of the x variables, the time trend and the dummy for year 1981 or 
after, are based on sample year and so measured without error). 
In this case, the OLS estimator based on observed variables is again inconsistent, with plim! !"# = ! !!∗!∗ + !!! !! !!∗!∗!− !!!!  
and !!!! being the first column of  Σuu#, that is, the variance and covariances between the 
measurement errors in  x1 and in each x-variable. 
The feasible consistent estimator we use is then !!! − !!!! !! !! !− !! + !!!!!  
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with X the x-variables stacked up by year and T the number of years (28 in our data),  Suu  a 
consistent estimate of  Σuu  and  !!!! its first column. Again, these estimates come from the 
pooled micro-data.  
The results based on the estimators just described are presented in columns (5) and (6) 
of Table 3, along with bootstrapped confidence intervals (based on 1000 replications). The 
coefficients on ownership at thirty are now -0.798 and -0.803, respectively, for the 
specifications without and with additional controls. These results are very much in line with 
the instrumental variables estimates. Both suggest a relatively small (exaggerating) net effect 
of biases due to measurement error on the OLS estimate.   
  
[Table 3 about here] 
Taken together, these estimates, using two different methods to correct for possible 
measurement error bias, suggest a very robust result. There is substantial catch up, and 
cohorts with low homeownership rates at thirty have closed about 80% of the “ownership-
gap” by the time they reach age forty. Thus, during our sample period of 1970 to 2007, the 
observation of a low ownership rate at age 30 was not a strong indicator that ownership 
would also be low at 40. A caveat to this result is that description of the latest data by Hood 
and Joyce (2013), suggests that the cohort that reached age 40 in around 2012 had a low 
ownership rate at age 30 and at age 40; it remains to be seen whether this is a new trend or a 
feature of the unusual (Great Recession) period in which this cohort lived out its 30s.     
To check the sensitivity of our results and assess the role of other determinants of 
catch-up, we include additional regressors in the baseline specification of Table 3. We choose 
regressors that are most in line with those used for ownership at thirty, bearing in mind that 
the catch-up regressions are done at the cohort level rather than at the individual level. We 
include, in turn and then all together, variables that are intended to describe the most 
favourable housing and credit market conditions that cohorts faced during their thirties. These 
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variables, with descriptive statistics in online Appendix Table A.3, are: the minimum ratio of 
house price to income between age 31 and age 40, where house prices are the English annual 
first-time buyer levels, and income is the annual average from 31 to 40 year olds; the 
minimum interest rate between age 31 and age 40; and, the maximum level of the credit 
conditions index (CCI) between age 31 and age 40.23 Table 4 reports the results of the 
measurement error correction specification; we prefer this method for dealing with 
endogeneity because, while qualitatively similar results were found if we used two stage least 
squares, the coefficient on the excluded variable becomes insignificant in the first stage in the 
cases in which the credit conditions index is used as a control (columns (3) and (4) in Table 
4).  
[Table 4 about here] 
In contrast to our findings regarding ownership at 30, it is the interest rate and credit 
conditions variables (rather than the house price variable) that are sometimes significant in 
the regressions reported in Table 4. On the other hand, the additional regressors do not 
account for our catch up results in the sense that they do weaken the coefficients on 
ownership at thirty. Indeed, adding a control for the minimum ratio of the house price to 
income between age 31 and 40, as a measure of affordability of housing, does not affect our 
baseline estimates of catch up, giving a coefficient of -0.833 on ownership at 30. With the 
addition of the minimum interest rate or the maximum CCI, or all additional controls 
together, the magnitude of point estimate for the coefficient on ownership at 30 actually 
increases, but we can never reject the hypotheses of full catch up or of equality with the 
results found in our baseline analyses. Thus our interpretation is that our catch-up findings 
are robust to adding these extra controls. The unusually long data set available given our 
adoption of synthetic cohort techniques, was crucial for finding these results. While it would 
be interesting to say more about the determinants of catch up, we feel that this would require 
further innovations of data or method. 
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V. EARLY OWNERSHIP AND PERSISTENT EFFECTS ON OTHER OUTCOMES 
While the preceding analysis supports the hypothesis of full or near full “catch up” in 
homeownership rates, it does not rule out the possibility that ability to get on to the housing 
ladder by age thirty persistently affects other outcomes, such as the amount of housing assets 
that cohorts are ultimately able to purchase and/or the share of income spent on housing. To 
investigate this we continue to use the synthetic cohort data that we used for our catch up 
regressions, but we change the outcomes for the cohort at age 40 which we are relating to 
ownership rates at 30. In particular, we consider the average number of rooms (a proxy for 
house size) in the accommodation owned at age 40, the proportion of outright owners by age 
40, and the ratio of the (average) mortgage payment to (average) income,24 as dependent 
variables that we regress on the cohort ownership rate at age 30. The idea of these regressions 
is to consider whether earlier access to ownership is related subsequent advantages for those 
who own, and so the outcome variables are averages among 40 year-old home owners. Table 
5 shows descriptive statistics for these outcome variables, while results from the regressions 
are shown in Table 6. 
[Table 5 about here] 
 Table 6 shows results for the simplest specification with one regressor, but 
coefficients are not substantially affected if we add other regressors. Table 6 also reports 
results only for the “measurement error correction”. Similar results are found if we use an 
instrumental variables strategy, but we prefer to report the measurement error correction both 
for consistency with Table 4, and because in the regression for number of rooms (where three 
observations are lost due to top-coding resulting in non-comparability in the data) the 
excluded variable (ownership at 29) is not significant in the first-stage.25 It should be noted 
that since we are no longer considering a “catch-up” regression, the “measurement error 
correction” is now implemented by directly applying results from Deaton (1985). Thus, for 
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the univariate case that we report (and using the notation of Section IV above), the 
estimator26 is: 
!!"# = ! ! !! − !!!! !! !"  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
The positive coefficient in the number of rooms regression suggests that home-owners 
from cohorts that access ownership earlier may end up owning slightly bigger houses at age 
40. The coefficient of 4.767 suggests that a one standard deviation increase in home 
ownership at age 30 (an increase of 5.5 percentage points, see Table 5)  is associated with 
approximately an extra quarter of a room (on average) in the home owned at age 40. Based 
on our results for outright ownership and for the mortgage payment to income ratio, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that earlier access to ownership is not related to earlier outright 
ownership, or to mortgage payments being a lower drain on income by age 40.27  
The pattern of coefficients across the three regressions is therefore consistent with the 
idea that those who access ownership early exploit any advantage to buy bigger properties 
(either straight away or through upsizing) rather than to reduce the burden of mortgage debt. 
However, we should be cautious drawing such a conclusion as a lack of significance in 
regressions could simply indicate that we do not have enough data to test hypotheses.  
The results in this section necessarily relate to a limited set of (three) outcomes, the 
choice of which is largely data driven. Our analyses do not, for example, allow us to address 
whether those who access the housing market later end up buying in locations that have lower 
prices because they are less desirable in some dimension (perhaps in terms of local services 
or of commuting distances). Such interesting questions are left for further work. 
To get a fuller picture of the “persistence” of relationships, we might also like to test 
hypotheses at later ages than 40. This could be particularly valuable for the “outright 
ownership” variable, since most households pay off their mortgages rather later than at age 
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40 (in our sample only around 8 to 9 per cent are outright owners by 40, see Table 5). To this 
end we tried our regressions for outcomes measured at age 50, but reducing the sample size 
by 10 observations compared to Table 6 resulted in noisy coefficient estimates. Our main 
“positive” result for these other outcomes is thus that we find some evidence that earlier 
access to home ownership may result in the ownership of slightly larger homes at around age 
40.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS   
Due to the fact that England experiences significant house price volatility, with booms and 
busts, different birth cohorts have experienced very different housing market conditions in 
early adulthood. It is natural to ask whether these fluctuations have been associated with 
different homeownership outcomes for the birth cohorts that experienced them, and whether 
the differences, if present, persist into later life.   
There are number of ways that one could address these questions. In this paper we 
have investigated these questions empirically, employing successive FES/EFS surveys over 
almost forty years, in conjunction with synthetic cohort methods. These data and methods 
allow us to track the ownership rates of different birth cohorts over a time period that 
captures three housing booms, and two housing busts.  
We find that, over the past forty years, ownership rates at age thirty have varied 
substantially across birth cohorts. This variation is negatively correlated with house prices, 
but the relationship seems stronger before 1990 than subsequently. These patterns are 
common to men and women, and to the different regions of England.  Overall, our results 
suggest that when a birth cohort faces a house price to income ratio that is one standard 
deviation above trend in early adulthood, then the homeownership rate of that birth cohort at 
age thirty is approximately 4 percentage points lower.   
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There has been a secular decline in ownership at age thirty from the early-1990s on. 
This is associated with a coincident decline in the fraction of thirty year olds in couple 
households. It could be that causality runs from household formation to housing demand, or 
from housing prices or supply to household formation, or both, or neither.  
Those birth cohorts that were less likely to get onto the ladder by thirty were 
nonetheless subsequently able to “catch up”, to a large degree, with cohorts that experienced 
more favourable initial conditions. Measurement error means that the raw correlation 
between ownership at thirty and subsequent growth in ownership, may misstate the true 
degree of catch up. Nevertheless, two different econometric methods which address that 
problem, and ancillary evidence, suggest that in our sample period (1970 – 2007) the 
apparent catch up is real. Cohorts with low homeownership rates at thirty closed about 80% 
of the “ownership-gap” by the time they reach age forty. 
While there is full or near full “catch up” in homeownership rates, it is possible that 
ability to get on to the housing ladder by age thirty persistently affects other outcomes. We 
focus on housing outcomes. Our results are consistent with the idea that those who access 
ownership early exploit any advantage to buy bigger properties (either straight away or 
through upsizing) rather than to reduce the burden of mortgage debt. The “positive” result is 
that earlier access to home ownership may result in the ownership of slightly larger homes at 
around age 40.   
As with any analysis, ours has limitations. An obvious limitation of the analysis in 
this paper is that it only documents the association of housing market conditions with the 
experiences of successive cohorts of young adults, and stops short of drawing causal 
inferences. While these associations are certainly suggestive of an effect of housing market 
conditions on outcomes, it is quite possible that there are important effects that run in the 
opposite direction - from the size and characteristics of different birth cohorts reaching young 
adulthood to housing market conditions. Disentangling these different effects is important, 
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but beyond the scope of this paper. It is nevertheless important to document, as this paper 
does, the key facts on cohort homeownership, both as a basis for further empirical work, and 
as targets for any structural modeling to match.   
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Appendix 
a. Data details 
(i) House-price data 
Throughout this paper the house price data that we have used are based on house price 
indices that are now published by the Office for National Statistics (ONS), having transferred 
from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) from February 2012. 
The data are freely available via 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=House+Price+Indices#tab-data-tables. 
The main indices that we use are published in ONS House Price Indices reference tables 8, 9 
and 10 (previously DCLG live tables 590, 592 and 594). The indices are mix adjusted, where 
the mix adjustment is to allow for the fact that the composition of house types traded in the 
housing market changes from year to year (e.g. in some periods a higher proportion of large 
detached properties are traded, at other times flat sales are more important).  
Since we investigate entry in to the housing market, in most of our analyses we use house 
price indices for properties bought by first-time buyers (ONS tables 9 and 10). These first 
time buyer indices are published from quarter 1 of 1983. In order to have a longer time series 
we “backcast” the first time buyer indices using growth rates from the all properties index for 
the relevant geographical area. Our main results are not substantially affected by avoiding 
this backcasting either by starting the analysis from 1983 or by using an all properties house 
price index (see also the discussion around Table 1 in Section III; full details on request).  
With the published all properties price indices, and our extended first-time buyer indices, 
we have quarterly data beginning in quarter two of 1968. The data include separate series for 
the UK and for Great Britain, for England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, and for 
English regions (nine “government office regions”). We generally use the series for England, 
or the series for English regions, depending on which is appropriate to the analysis.  
To convert from the price index into a price level, we use mix-adjusted prices for quarter 1 
(February) of 2002, which are also published by and freely available from ONS (ONS table 
13, previously DCLG live table 508).  
In much of the paper, and many of our regression specifications, the house price variable 
that we use is a house price to average income ratio. To compute these ratios we divide the 
house price by average family income in our FES/EFS data. Generally we take average 
incomes at the region and quarter level (though some figures display statistics at national 
and/or annual level and in these cases average incomes are consistent with this). For the 
analyses of ownership at age 30 the price to income ratio is the relevant house price (the 
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regional first time buyer price in our main specifications) divided by the average family 
income of individuals around age 30; to get a reasonable cell size for taking average income 
by region and quarter we average across individuals aged 26 – 34 (inclusive). For our 
synthetic cohort regressions the object of analysis is changes after 30 and up to 40 (rather 
than levels at age 30), and so in those specifications where it is used the house price to 
income variable is defined in terms of the incomes of those aged 31 to 40, again averaged at 
the region and quarter level.          
In places we use (the log of) real house prices. To convert nominal house prices in to real 
prices we deflate using the all-item Retail Prices Index to December 2007 levels (2007 is the 
latest year in our FES data on ownership). The RPI data are published by the Office for 
National Statistics, and we have monthly data. To deflate the quarterly house price series we 
use the (mean) average of the RPI for the 3 months corresponding to each quarter. 
Though the house price data start in quarter two of 1968, not all the English regions have 
data for the full period due to changes in the drawing of regional boundaries. In particular the 
North-East, East (i.e. East Anglia) and South East series are available from quarter two of 
1992, while the North West series is available from quarter one of 1999. When exploiting 
regional data, we either drop region-years in which the house price is not available, or, for the 
figures plotting the house price and ownership in broad English regions, we construct the 
price series based on only a subset of the more narrow regions that are the constituent parts of 
our broader regions. To ensure that changes in data availability by region do not generate 
changes in cell composition in our synthetic cohort results, in those analyses we always use 
national house price series that are available in all periods. 
(ii) Credit Conditions Index 
As mentioned in the main text, the Credit Conditions Index (CCI) that we use in 
specification 3 of table 1 and in specifications 3 and 4 of table 4, comes from Fernandez-
Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006). Their index is constructed, for the period from the mid-
1970s to the early 2000s, as the common underlying influence on ten measures of credit 
conditions. These measures include aggregate unsecured debt and mortgages, and age and 
region specific measures of the fraction of high loan-to-income, and value-to-income, 
mortgages. The ten equation system that is estimated includes controls for a comprehensive 
set of economic and demographic influences on the demand and supply of credit. Thus the 
unified CCI that is derived captures the common variation in the ten credit indicators which 
cannot be explained by the economic and demographic controls. It is this index that we use in 
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our analysis. Full details of it and its construction are provided in Fernandez-Corugedo and 
Muellbauer (2006). 
b. Synthetic-Cohort Analysis: checking for group consistency 
 As mentioned above, before we apply synthetic cohort analyses to regional samples, we 
need to conduct some checks on the data to make sure it is valid to do so.  
The cohort methods hinge on cohort composition remaining constant over time. Random 
samples of fifty year-olds in 1980 and 60-years olds in 1990 are informative about the 
average experience of individuals in the 1930 birth cohort if the set of people in the 
population with that characteristic (born in 1930) is fairly constant between 1980 and 1990. If 
that is not the case then changes in the homeownership rate between 1980 and 1990 will 
confound changes in the homeownership rate among the individuals that the 1980 sample 
was drawn from with changes in the composition of the cohort.  
At a national level, the main threats to the validity of this assumption are (i) immigration, 
(ii) emigration, and (iii) differential mortality. For example, suppose that the 1930 birth-
cohort experiences some mortality between 1980 and 1990 and that this mortality is 
concentrated amongst those with lower socioeconomic status and wealth. As these people are 
less likely to own homes this can lead to a rise in the homeownership rate of the cohort even 
though there is no change in the homeownership probability of any given individual in the 
cohort. As we are ultimately interested in the life-course experience of individuals, we would 
consider this a spurious selection (or compositional) effect. Similar effects arise if, for 
example, immigrants who join a cohort as it ages have lower (or higher) homeownership 
rates than the native born. 
Turning to regional analysis, we face two main difficulties. First, if we look at smaller 
regions then the available sample for any given birth cohort in any given survey year can be 
quite small. These small cell sizes then lead to considerable sampling variation in the 
homeownership rate of a given birth-cohort, at a given age, in a given region. The resulting 
age paths of homeownership are therefore potentially quite noisy, with meaningless year-on-
year variations.  
The second problem is that threats to the validity of the constant birth cohort composition 
assumption are potentially more severe at the regional level. This is because inter-regional 
migration might be greater than international migration.  
There is a way to check these issues internally in the data. The idea is to use the data to 
track across age a characteristic (or characteristics) of a birth-cohort (or birth/region cohort) 
that we believe should be constant. If cohort composition does change over time, we might 
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expect this to be manifest in these age profiles. To implement this idea, we organized the data 
for England into three large regions (South, Midlands and North) and within each region, into 
10-year birth cohorts. We then examine two features of each cohort as it ages: cohort size, 
and the fraction of individuals in the cohort who left full-time education at or after age 18. 
Changes in estimated cohort size would reflect mortality as well as migration into and out of 
the region. The fraction of individuals in the cohort who left full-time education at or after 
age 18 should of course be roughly constant after age 18 and if it changes as the cohort ages 
this would indicate either differential mortality or that higher (or lower) education individuals 
are being added (or subtracted) from the cohort by migration.  
The results of this analysis are presented in Figures A.1 and A.2. As always we have been 
careful to use the survey weights in all calculations. Figure A.1 shows the estimated cohort 
size for a set of cohorts defined by region of residence (South, Midlands, North) and 10 year 
birth cohort (1930s, 1940s, 1950s, 1960s). Size is on the vertical axis and age on the 
horizontal axis. Vertical differences between cohort lines indicate “cohort effects.” For 
example, particularly in the South, the 1960s birth cohort (in solid dark grey) is significantly 
larger than the 1930s cohort (in dashed light grey). The line for each cohort traces out the age 
profile for that cohort. This figure shows some mild decline in estimated cohort size as each 
cohort ages, which probably reflects a combination of mortality and net emigration. There is 
some suggestion of an accelerated decline in cohort size past age 65 (which we see in our 
data only for the 1930s cohort) which might be consistent with accelerating mortality or 
emigration associated with retirement.  
[Figure A.1 and A.2 about here] 
The key point that we draw from Figure A.1, however, is that changes in estimated cohort 
size are quite modest (at least before age 65) and very similar across birth cohorts and 
regions. We would have been rather more concerned if Figure A.1 showed cohorts in one 
region growing while cohorts in other regions shrank, indicating substantial net migration 
between regions. This does not, however, appear to be the case.  
Figure A.2 follows the same pattern but traces out the fraction of individuals in the cohort 
who left full-time education at or after age 18. The age profiles of the different cohorts are 
fairly noisy, and perhaps exhibit some small upward trend with age. The latter would be 
consistent with differential mortality (higher socioeconomic status individuals having greater 
life-expectancy) and/or some incidence of older individuals returning to school. The main 
point again is that the age effects do not appear to be dramatic, and do not appear to differ 
significantly across regions. 
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It would certainly be possible to push this analysis further, for example by subjecting the 
age profiles apparent in these figures to formal statistical tests. But our conclusion from these 
figures is that analysis at the level of broad regions is feasible, and the constant composition 
assumption is no more dangerous at this level of region than at the level of England as a 
whole. On the other hand, the sampling variability in age profiles apparent especially in 
Figure A.2 suggests to us that, due to small sample sizes, analysis at the level of more 
disaggregated regions would not be advisable.  
c. Further Descriptive Statistics 
This subsection provides further detail on the pseudo-panel data constructed from 
successive FES/EFS surveys.  
[Tables A.1 and A.2 about here] 
[Table A.3 about here] 
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Figure 1: Log Real House Prices, and the House Price to Income Ratio (for the “young”), 
with the Cyclical Component of GDP, England 1968 – 2007 (quarterly) 
 
Notes: In the “House Price” panel the vertical axes are: real house prices in thousands of 2007 pounds (left-hand axis), and the 
cyclical component of log real GDP from the Hodrick-Prescott filter (right-hand axis). The real house price axis is plotted on a 
logarithmic scale but labeled in (2007) pounds. House prices are deflated by the authors using the all items retail prices index.  
In the “House Price to Income” panel the vertical axes are: the house price to income ratio (left-hand axis), and the cyclical 
component of log real GDP from the Hodrick-Prescott filter (right-hand axis). The house price to income ratio is the ratio of the 
first time buyer house price to average incomes around age 30 (ages 26 – 34) in our data, the same ratio that we use in the 
regressions reported in table 1. Fuller details of the data, and particularly of the house price data, are as described in the online!
technical appendix to the paper. 
 
 
Figure 2: Local authority housing stock sold through the right to buy scheme in England,  
1980 – 2009 
 
Notes: This chart uses data and reproduces a figure that are published by the Department for Communities and Local Government: see chart 
671 via http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/socialhousingsales/livetables/ . 
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Figure 3: Proportion of individuals aged thirty who are owner-occupiers, and ratio of  
(first time buyer) house price to average income around 30, 1971-2007, England. 
 
Notes: As in Figure 1 and in the regressions in Table 1, the house price to average income series is the ratio of the first time buyer 
house price to average incomes around age 30 (ages 26 – 34) in our data. 
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Figure 4: Proportion of individuals aged thirty who are owner-occupiers, with the same by couple status, and 
the proportion of thirty-year olds who are in couples, 1971-2007, England. 
 
 
Figure 5: Ownership rates at different ages by year: all individuals, England 
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Figure 6: Catch up by forty? 
Ownership change (rate at forty – rate at thirty), against ownership at thirty, 
England and regions 
 
 
Figure 7: Catch up by fifty? 
Ownership change (rate at fifty – rate at thirty), against ownership at thirty, 
England and regions 
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Figure A.1: Population sizes by broad region for (10year) cohorts 
 
 
 
Figure A.2: Proportion who left full-time education at or after age 18 
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Table 1:  Probit Regression for Ownership at Thirty, Pooled Data for England: Dependent Variable: Ownership at thirty 
 
Regressor 
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
Marginal  
effect 
 
 
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
Marginal  
effect 
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
Marginal  
effect 
Coeff 
(s.e.) 
Marginal  
effect 
             
House price / income -0.1076 (0.0264) 
*** -0.0414 -0.1140 (0.0280) 
*** -0.0435 -0.1050 (0.0367) 
*** -0.0400    
Nominal interest rate 0.0020 (0.0095) 
 0.0007 0.0014 (0.0107) 
 0.0005 0.0011 (0.0010) 
 0.0004 -0.0035 (0.0113)  -0.0013 
Credit Conditions Index   -0.0855 (0.4897) 
 -0.0325 0.0979 (0.5228)  0.0373 
             
RTB sales this year 0.2896 (0.0585) 
*** 0.1115 0.2575 (0.0671) 
*** 0.0983 0.2817 (0.1801) 
 0.1072 0.1848 (0.1798) 
 0.0704 
Cumulative RTB sales -0.0068 (0.0069) 
 -0.0026 -0.0088 (0.0082) 
 -0.0034 -0.0046 (0.0256) 
 -0.0017 -0.0256 (0.0263) 
 -0.0098 
Log family income 0.9068 (0.0676) 
*** 0.3491 0.8955 (0.0716) 
*** 0.3417 0.8680 (0.0720) 
*** 0.3302 0.8720 (0.0717) 
*** 0.3319 
Female (0/1) 0.1008 (0.0311) 
*** 0.0388 0.0656 (0.0338) 
* 0.0250 0.0686 (0.0362) 
* 0.0261 0.0690 (0.0368) 
* 0.0263 
Couple (0/1) 0.6694 (0.0560) 
*** 0.2604 0.6305 (0.0562) 
*** 0.2439 0.6576 (0.0555) 
*** 0.2540 0.6569 (0.0545) 
*** 0.2538 
Number of kids -0.1295 (0.0187) 
*** -0.0499 -0.1050 (0.0228) 
*** -0.0400 -0.1169 (0.0227) 
*** -0.0445 -0.1192 (0.0226) 
*** -0.0454 
Post-compuls Educ (0/1)  0.1968 (0.0371) 
*** 0.0751 0.1980 (0.0393) 
*** 0.0753 0.1843 (0.0408) 
*** 0.0701 
              
Sample and sample size 
Pseudo r-squared 
1969 – 2007, 5687 
0.2103 
1978 – 2007, 4623 
0.2244 
1978 – 2005, 4328 
0.2190 
1978 – 2005, 4328 
0.2165 
Notes: (a) Eight region dummies and a constant are included in all specifications; (b) Standard errors clustered at the year level;  
(c) Marginal effects measured at means of independent variables; (d) ***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for Ownership Rate, Selected Ages and Cohorts, England 
 
 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Minimum 
observed 
Maximum 
observed 
(a) Ownership Rate at Age Thirty and Forty, Among Cohorts Observed at Both Ages 
Note: Based on 29 observations at each age, (1979-2007 for age 40, 1969-1997 for age 30). 
Age 40 0.729 0.043 0.737 0.631 0.817 
Age 30 0.609 0.055 0.618 0.468 0.713 
(b) Ownership Rate at Age Thirty and Fifty Among Cohorts Observed at Both Ages 
Note: Based on 19 observations at each age, (1989-2007 for age 50, 1969-1987 for age 30). 
Age 50 0.793 0.036 0.801 0.729 0.863 
Age 30 0.591 0.054 0.589 0.468 0.713 
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Table 3: Catch up Regression Estimates 
Dependent variable: change in ownership rate, age forty minus age thirty, England 
 
 OLS Two-Stage Least Squares Measurement Error correction 
 
 
Regressor 
(1) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(2) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(3) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(4) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(5) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
(6) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
Ownership at age 30 
 
Year 1981 or after (0/1) 
 
Couple (0/1) at age 30 
 
Constant 
 
-0.871 *** 
(-1.162,-0.579) 
 
 
 
 
0.654 *** 
(0.475,0.833) 
-0.951 *** 
(-1.375,-0.527) 
0.019 
(-0.052,0.091) 
0.073 
(-0.369,0.516) 
0.635 *** 
(0.245,1.025) 
-0.835 ** 
(-1.499,-0.172) 
 
 
 
 
0.632 *** 
(0.226,1.039) 
-0.820 * 
(-1.688,0.047) 
0.006 
(-0.094,0.107) 
-0.042 
(-0.392,0.476) 
0.587 ** 
(0.136,1.037) 
-0.798 *** 
(-1.206,-0.506) 
 
-0.803 ** 
(-1.675,-0.091) 
0.021 
(-0.076,0.114) 
0.190 
(-0.541,0.752) 
 
Observations 
R-squared 
 
28 
0.59 
 
28 
0.60 
 
28 
 
 
28 
 
 
28 
 
28 
Notes: (a) ***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
(b) For columns (3) and (4) (two-stage least squares): coefficients of the second stage are reported. In the first stage ownership at thirty is 
regressed on the regressors included in the second stage, plus ownership at twenty-nine. Ownership at twenty-nine is the “excluded variable” 
and has a coefficient of 0.371 (s.e. 0.164) for the specification of column (3) and of 0.317 (s.e. 0.135) for column (4). 
(c) For columns (5) and (6) (measurement error correction): (i) Details on the methodology adopted for the measurement error correction are 
provided in Section IV; (ii) data are in deviations from means and so there is no constant; (iii) reported confidence intervals and significance 
tests (stars on coefficients) are obtained by bootstrapping (1000 replications, strata:  age and year of birth). 
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Table 4: Catch up Regression Estimates: Sensitivity to adding regressors 
Dependent variable: change in ownership rate, age forty minus age thirty, England 
Estimation method: measurement error correction 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
M.E. Correction 
Ownership at age 30 
 
Year 1981 or after (0/1) 
 
Couple (0/1) at age 30 
 
Min HP/income 31 – 40 
 
Min int. rate 31 – 40 
 
Max CCI 31 – 40  
 
 
-0.833 ** 
(-1.562, -0.247) 
0.019  
(-0.079, 0.117) 
0.165 
(-0.565, 0.767) 
0.016 
(-0.061, 0.064) 
. 
. 
. 
. 
 
-1.174 ** 
(-1.849, -0.261) 
0.031 
(-0.093, 0.102) 
0.854 
(-0.383, 1.333) 
. 
. 
0.010 ** 
(0.001, 0.147) 
. 
. 
 
-1.819 ** 
(-2.234, -0.267) 
0.107  
(-0.070, 0.150) 
1.033 
(-0.395, 1.479) 
. 
. 
. 
. 
0.271 * 
(-0.000, 0.354) 
 
-1.414 **  
(-2.011, -0.087) 
0.096 
(-0.031, 0.161) 
0.632 
(-0.477, 1.302) 
0.037 
(0.039, 0.070) 
0.012 ** 
(0.002, 0.026) 
0.157 
(-0.090, 0.300) 
Observations 28 28 28 28 
Notes: (a) ***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
(b) Details on the methodology for the measurement error correction are provided in Section IV.  
(c) Data are in deviations from means and so there is no constant.  
(d) Reported confidence intervals and significance tests (stars on coefficients) are obtained by 
bootstrapping (1000 replications, strata:  age and year of birth). 
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Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Number of Rooms, Outright Ownership, and Mortgage Payment to Income 
The statistics are for the distribution of averages for 40 year-old home-owners in our data for England  
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Minimum 
observed 
Maximum 
observed 
Number of Rooms 6.092 0.264 6.002 5.689 6.539 
Outright Ownership Rate 0.086 0.021 0.084 0.047 0.136 
Average Mortgage Payment / 
Average Income 
0.142 0.023 0.141 0.109 0.214 
 
Notes: In line with the regressions in Table 6, for “number of rooms” there are 25 annual observations (1980 – 2004, 
the variable is top-coded from 2005); for the other variables there are 28 observations (1980 – 2007). 
 
 
 
Table 6: Cohort Analyses of House Size, Outright Ownership and Mortgage Payment to Income 
Dependent variables for owners at 40, England,  
Estimation method: measurement error correction 
 
 
Dependent variable: Number of  
Rooms 
Outright 
Ownership 
Mortgg. Payment / 
Income (ratio)  
 Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
Coeff 
(95% c.i.) 
M.E. Correction 
Ownership at age 30 
 
 
 
4.767 *** 
(1.648, 5.532) 
 
 
-0.079 
(-0.267, 0.168) 
 
 
-0.004  
(-0.157, 0.142) 
 
Observations 25 28 28 
Notes: (a) ***, ** and * respectively indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
(b) Details on the methodology for the measurement error correction are provided in Section IV.  
(c) Data are in deviations from means and so there is no constant.  
(d) Reported confidence intervals and significance tests (stars on coefficients) are obtained by 
bootstrapping (1000 replications, strata:  age and year of birth). 
(e) All dependent variables are averages across home-owners at age 40.  
(f) For the “number of rooms” regression, the 25 observations are from 1970 – 2004 (included): 
from 2005 the dependent variable is top coded and so no longer comparable to earlier waves. 
(g) The mortgage payment to income variable is the ratio of average mortgage payment in the 
sample of 40 year-old owners, to average income in this sample. Averaging before taking the ratio 
improves robustness to the presence of “outlier” individual families with very high mortgage 
payment to income ratios (often due to low reported income).   
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Table&A.1&Ownership&Rates,&Ages&thirty7fifty&
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
       |                                            Year of Birth                                                                                          
  Year | 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967  
-------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  1969 | .533                                                                                                                                              
  1970 | .595 .468                                                                                                                                         
  1971 | .512 .557 .586                                                                                                                                    
  1972 | .578 .589 .602 .545                                                                                                                               
  1973 | .559 .598 .574  .58 .581                                                                                                                          
  1974 | .601 .606 .561 .664   .6 .563                                                                                                                     
  1975 | .635 .613 .653 .599 .574 .601 .617                                                                                                                
  1976 | .629 .603 .632  .66 .642 .642 .585 .589                                                                                                           
  1977 | .628 .644 .546 .613 .573  .69 .636 .639  .62                                                                                                      
  1978 | .638 .621 .668 .642 .633 .624 .652 .679 .622 .571                                                                                                 
  1979 | .632  .69 .672 .659 .738 .654 .633 .727 .588 .644 .557                                                                                            
  1980 | .683 .631 .701 .635  .69 .706 .681 .648 .656  .61  .67 .543                                                                                       
  1981 | .553 .636 .696 .667  .66 .659 .693 .651 .689 .639 .655  .62 .593                                                                                  
  1982 | .668 .642  .68 .675  .66 .737  .72 .681 .693 .672 .681 .663 .696 .591                                                                             
  1983 | .687 .662 .738 .718 .753  .79 .721 .772 .778 .735 .663 .673 .739 .641 .635                                                                        
  1984 | .774 .719 .739 .717 .684 .737 .719 .698 .759 .693 .731  .71 .686  .61 .599 .713                                                                   
  1985 | .719 .766  .72 .693 .683 .741 .721 .755 .784 .736 .704 .762 .743 .721 .677 .613 .664                                                              
  1986 |  .73 .746  .75 .797  .79 .783 .771  .72 .684 .717 .746 .728 .761 .754 .702 .691 .669 .618                                                         
  1987 | .786 .711 .766 .767  .78 .758 .817 .769 .793 .746 .739 .707 .742 .724 .737  .64 .683 .682 .635                                                    
  1988 | .736 .709 .794 .737 .756  .81 .771 .757  .78 .762 .801 .717 .753 .707  .73 .636  .74 .702 .605 .653                                               
  1989 | .801 .697 .766  .76 .774 .802  .77 .792 .778 .758 .786 .789 .722  .78 .748 .724 .747 .703 .656 .699 .675                                          
  1990 |      .762 .786 .786 .803 .836 .795 .796 .822 .814 .842 .688 .774  .78 .772 .749 .742 .739 .795 .702 .717 .649                                     
  1991 |           .805 .762 .797 .783 .817 .798 .848 .726 .784 .767 .817 .829  .79 .765 .755 .736 .712 .724 .676 .743 .704                                
  1992 |                .805 .837 .762 .811 .846 .807 .798 .805 .761 .758 .766 .701 .699 .769 .679 .692 .767 .678 .676 .637 .656                           
  1993 |                     .858 .796 .853 .824 .843 .769 .752 .794 .777  .75 .757 .686 .767 .721 .757 .674 .756 .684 .667 .671 .623                      
  1994 |                          .818 .851 .833 .825 .803 .814  .83 .737 .826 .747 .734 .759 .817 .708 .696 .699  .75 .682 .684 .633 .666                 
  1995 |                               .804 .775 .769 .787 .767 .867 .796 .724 .725 .769 .732 .772 .717 .682  .75  .73 .745 .679 .697 .616 .643            
  1996 |                                    .833 .804 .834   .8 .733 .797 .803 .722 .752 .774 .761 .824 .679 .685 .675 .674  .69  .59 .608 .644 .556       
  1997 |                                         .786 .818 .823 .793 .754 .778  .82 .779 .716 .744 .753 .729 .764 .754 .737 .695  .67 .648 .744 .585 .625  
  1998 |                                               .76 .802 .816 .801   .8 .774  .78 .758 .759  .76 .705 .667 .718 .725 .705 .699 .631 .711 .668 .629  
  1999 |                                                   .766 .809  .78   .8 .825 .808   .8 .767 .756 .694 .755 .772 .752 .723 .768 .683 .649 .675 .668  
  2000 |                                                        .758 .806 .783 .833 .747 .847 .803 .714 .743 .772 .746 .705 .756 .691 .712 .665 .744 .714  
  2001 |                                                             .763 .772 .806 .786 .797 .823  .78 .779 .717 .694 .681 .764 .714 .717 .669 .705 .697  
  2002 |                                                                  .813 .843 .822 .844 .794 .829 .776 .795 .736 .753 .747 .753 .745 .702 .736 .632  
  2003 |                                                                       .815 .828 .814 .784 .776 .802 .792 .769 .777 .769 .741 .737 .719 .782  .76  
  2004 |                                                                            .763 .787 .771 .829 .794 .743 .765 .716 .759  .73 .701 .686  .71  .69  
  2005 |                                                                                 .863  .75  .79 .813 .791 .766 .728 .737 .717 .749 .712 .697 .763  
  2006 |                                                                                      .729 .797 .815 .794 .779 .749 .755 .775 .782  .75 .752 .731  
  2007 |                                                                                           .772 .793 .736 .758 .781 .766  .72 .716 .737 .725   .7  
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Table&A.2&Cell&Sizes 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
       |                                               Year of Birth                                                                                       
  year | 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967  
-------+-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
  1969 |  222                                                                                                                                              
  1970 |  183  180                                                                                                                                         
  1971 |  239  222  222                                                                                                                                    
  1972 |  187  214  215  221                                                                                                                               
  1973 |  204  189  212  202  245                                                                                                                          
  1974 |  191  187  192  214  229  210                                                                                                                     
  1975 |  208  208  196  206  247  232  247                                                                                                                
  1976 |  204  201  185  219  188  233  241  235                                                                                                           
  1977 |  199  210  184  210  204  204  244  272  325                                                                                                      
  1978 |  178  184  184  193  228  197  202  203  301  282                                                                                                 
  1979 |  194  162  185  188  204  224  217  216  251  266  256                                                                                            
  1980 |  171  171  170  217  219  250  239  250  262  269  207  234                                                                                       
  1981 |  209  192  184  219  221  248  274  247  322  302  273  273  247                                                                                  
  1982 |  191  212  190  199  215  218  267  261  334  280  252  252  255  220                                                                             
  1983 |  176  186  200  168  206  212  228  219  309  262  261  234  229  223  227                                                                        
  1984 |  174  177  189  190  204  218  198  175  230  230  227  240  239  243  199  246                                                                   
  1985 |  164  166  158  190  191  165  196  215  275  262  259  235  238  217  215  215  228                                                              
  1986 |  151  155  166  190  191  218  182  235  234  223  219  223  228  211  226  229  236  234                                                         
  1987 |  157  167  141  164  199  202  199  208  247  267  234  241  236  219  254  210  235  229  259                                                    
  1988 |  169  170  150  183  167  188  226  240  265  256  227  218  217  197  249  242  202  216  212  211                                               
  1989 |  162  161  157  163  182  197  220  222  269  237  250  205  230  186  216  244  204  212  228  216  230                                          
  1990 |       136  135  144  172  204  176  179  230  226  202  211  188  199  186  193  228  222  218  202  246  223                                     
  1991 |            134  155  181  178  200  208  202  179  200  178  202  204  211  199  198  199  234  234  209  208  196                                
  1992 |                 155  211  179  203  200  273  229  195  218  189  202  220  214  211  220  246  235  248  238  267  243                           
  1993 |                      167  161  176  176  234  222  190  175  192  163  198  194  193  212  212  216  240  196  245  216  265                      
  1994 |                           170  149  164  229  220  203  182  192  182  178  197  195  198  211  227  216  207  198  225  222  228                 
  1995 |                                144  188  219  213  181  182  188  165  198  202  178  187  205  210  209  212  229  225  236  255  235            
  1996 |                                     172  196  193  189  149  160  173  153  190  180  187  184  202  235  199  213  251  238  241  241  224       
  1997 |                                          204  168  160  180  162  170  152  181  180  176  185  178  228  211  234  229  222  202  241  211  194  
  1998 |                                               159  170  145  169  153  146  152  152  199  175  194  172  189  197  186  209  212  212  199  194  
  1999 |                                                    165  158  178  131  169  180  166  166  177  179  197  185  177  202  204  226  207  227  246  
  2000 |                                                         179  160  152  163  180  165  152  152  155  151  164  195  163  189  181  218  217  203  
  2001 |                                                              174  164  178  180  174  206  185  203  196  210  249  204  237  237  242  244  205  
  2002 |                                                                   177  181  157  155  176  170  191  160  192  221  197  210  216  210  214  228  
  2003 |                                                                        156  174  159  172  200  169  188  189  193  206  227  246  223  207  190  
  2004 |                                                                             163  153  177  175  186  186  190  195  216  213  224  195  191  190  
  2005 |                                                                                  141  155  166  180  183  191  188  178  212  198  217  212  217  
  2006 |                                                                                       133  169  178  189  162  189  200  210  186  192  202  169  
  2007 |                                                                                            165  149  168  158  163  190  169  161  164  175  153  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------#
#
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Table A.3: Descriptive Statistics for Regressors in the Cohort Regressions 
 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Median Minimum 
observed 
Maximum 
observed 
Couple (0/1) at age 30 0.761 0.067 0.751 0.659 0.893 
Min HP/income 31 – 40 2.594 0.107 2.589 2.326 2.869 
Min int. rate 31 – 40 (percent rate) 6.050 1.975 5.201 3.544 9.263 
Max CCI 31 – 40 0.811 0.212 0.871 0.120 1 
 
Notes: There are 28 annual observations, in line with the sample from the regressions reported in Tables 3 and 4 and 
in the final two specifications in Table 6. For the final independent variable, 61% of the sample is age 30 in or after 
1981.#
#
######################################## ####################
* Author order is alphabetical. Previous versions of this work were circulated under the titles “House Prices and Homeownership: 
a Cohort Analysis” and “Late starters or excluded generations? A cohort analysis of catch-up in home ownership in England”.  
 
1 Sources: Department for Communities and Local Government (house prices) and ONS (Average Earnings). 
2 There is concern with “generation gaps” in home ownership. See for example, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/52a03274-bce1-11e4-
a917-00144feab7de.html. 
3 The name of this survey changed in 2001, although the content and design largely continued, so that it is possible to construct a 
consistent series.  
4 Where a family is adult singles or couples, plus any dependent children. In the UK this corresponds to a benefit unit. 
5 We in fact use their credit conditions index in Section III. 
6 Some local schemes had existed in the 1970s. 
7 For the raw data, see chart 671 via 
http://www.communities.gov.uk/housing/housingresearch/housingstatistics/housingstatisticsby/socialhousingsales/livetables/  
8 This number of sales is a product of both the policy, and of the decision of tenants of whether to exercise their “right to buy”. A 
full discussion of the policy (and this aspect in particular), is provided by Disney and Luo (2015).  
9 See:  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=House+Price+Indices#tab-data-tables  
10 This measure was chosen because consistent data are available for a long time period. For the period in which data overlap it is 
very close to the Bank of England base rate. 
11 Full details are available on request. 
12 These dissagregations are not shown, but figures with these ownership rates by group are available in Bottazzi, Crossley and 
Wakefield (2010). 
13 As a sensitivity test, we have also estimated all three models on a common time frame. The results are similar and are available 
on request.  
14  We experimented with also including a variable indicating that an observation is from 1981 or after, but when included 
alongside the right to buy variables, all three were not separately statistically significant. We chose to keep the more interpretable 
measures of the impact of the policy. 
15 The credit conditions index used by Fernandez-Corugedo and Muellbauer (2006) runs until 2001 but has been extended. We 
thank Anthony Murphy for sharing this data. We get very similar results if we truncate the sample at 2001.  
16 Standard deviation computed from residuals of a regression of house-price-to-income on region dummies. 
17 There is also evidence that the credit conditions index matters for consumption (Aron et al, 2012). 
18 It is perhaps worth noting that, unlike the price variable, the credit conditions variable and the interest rate do not vary at the 
regional level. Additionally, and to anticipate, we find more of a role for credit conditions and the interest rate when we 
investigate changes in ownership rates after age 30 (see section IV).  
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19 Full results of the analyses discussed in this paragraph are available on request from the authors. 
20 Full results of the analyses discussed in this paragraph are available on request from the authors. 
21 Of course, we could graph the level of ownership at age 40 (or 50) against ownership at age 30 (rather than having growth in 
ownership on the vertical axis.) This would eliminate the 2nd of the two biases described in the text. The slope of the graph would 
then be one plus the degree of catch up. Similarly, the regressions described below could be run with the level of ownership at age 
40 (or 50) as the dependent variable, rather than the “growth regression” specification we currently use. This would allow the 
formulas suggested in Deaton (1985) to be applied directly. We work with ownership growth for two reasons. First, because of the 
convenient “catch up” interpretation of the slope (or slope coefficient), and second, because of the possibility that the two biases 
described in the text may partially cancel out. While corrections can be applied to the regressions below in either form, this 
seemed the best way to approach the data graphically.  
22 Descriptive statistics for these regressors are in online Appendix Table A.3. 
23 The catch-up coefficient estimates are robust to other ways of summarizing these variables, such as taking the average between 
age 31 and age 40, the growth rate etc. 
24 The mortgage payment to income variable is the ratio of average mortgage payment in the sample of 40 year-old owners, to 
average income in this sample. Averaging before taking the ratio improves robustness to the presence of “outlier” individual 
families with very high mortgage payment to income ratios (often due to low reported income). 
25 Full results with more regressors, and/or using two-stage least squares, are available from the authors. 
26 This, in our notation and in univariate form, is Deaton’s equation (24) modified only for the fact that our x and y variables come 
from independent samples so we can continue to maintain the assumption that !!" = 0.  
27 We also experimented with using real mortgage payments at 40, and outstanding mortgage balances at 40, as outcome variables; 
however results (available on request) did not point to an advantage from early access to ownership, and coefficients were either 
not significant, or were not robust (even in sign) to the inclusion of regressors. 
